Epidemic waterborne risks are discussed in this paper. Although the true incidence of waterborne illness is not reflected in the currently reported outbreak statistics, outbreak surveillance has provided information about the important waterborne pathogens, relative degrees of risk associated with water sources and treatment processes, and adequacy of regulations. Pathogens and water system deficiencies that are identified in outbreaks may also be important causes of endemic waterborne illness. In recent years, investigators have identified a large number of pathogens responsible for outbreaks, and research has focused on their sources, resistance to water disinfection, and removal from drinking water. Outbreaks in surface water systems have decreased in the recent decade, most likely due to recent regulations and improved treatment efficacy. Of increased importance, however, are outbreaks caused by the microbial contamination of water distribution systems. In order to better estimate waterborne risks in the United States, additional information is needed about the contribution of distribution system contaminants to endemic waterborne risks and undetected waterborne outbreaks, especially those associated with distribution system contaminants.
INTRODUCTION
Waterborne disease outbreak (WBDO) statistics have been compiled in the United States since 1920. During 1920 to 1936, these data were collected by Gorman & Wolman (1939 . From 1937 to 1970, WBDO statistics were collected by several Federal agencies, and various investigators have evaluated and summarized the information (Committee on Public Works 1947; Eliassen & Cummings have the primary responsibility for detecting and investigating WBDOs, and these agencies voluntarily report WBDOs to the CDC. When requested, the CDC and EPA assist in outbreak investigations.
A standard reporting form is used to solicit data on the characteristics of the outbreak (e.g. dates of illness onset, duration of illness, and suspected or confirmed etiology), testing of water and patient samples, and contributory issues such as water disinfection practices and environmental factors. Information is also requested about the actual and estimated numbers of cases, hospitalizations, and fatalities. This information is evaluated and reported in WBDO surveillance summaries, which have been published biennially or annually since 1973 (CDC 1973 (CDC , 1974 (CDC , 1976a (CDC , b, 1977 (CDC , 1979 (CDC , 1980 (CDC , 1981 (CDC , 1982a (CDC , b, 1983 (CDC , 1984 (CDC , 1985 St. Louis, 1988; Levine & Craun, 1990; Herwaldt et al. 1991; Moore et al. 1993; Kramer et al. 1996; Levy et al. 1998; Barwick et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2002; Blackburn et al. 2004) .
Outbreaks associated with drinking water, recreational water, and other types of water exposures are reported.
WBDOs associated with cruise ships are not included in this surveillance system. In this paper, we consider only outbreaks associated with contaminated drinking water.
Classifying waterborne outbreaks and water systems

Outbreaks
For an event to be defined as a WBDO, two or more persons must have experienced a similar illness. This criterion is waived for single cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) and for single cases of chemical poisoning if water quality data indicate contamination by the chemical (Blackburn et al. 2004) .
Waterborne pathogens of concern in the United States have multiple transmission routes, including person-to-person contact and ingestion of contaminated food. Thus, epidemiologic evidence must implicate water as the probable source of the illness.
Since 1989, WBDOs have been classified according to the strength of the evidence (Table 1) implicating water (Blackburn et al. 2004 ). The classification system ensures objectivity in the review of outbreak reports and consistency in the reported statistics as well as encouraging investigators to submit more complete information. Classification is based on epidemiologic and water quality data provided by investigators. Outbreaks without water quality data can be included in the surveillance system, but reports that lack epidemiologic data are not. A classifi- may not be reported.
Outbreak reporting
Since WBDO surveillance is passive and reporting is voluntary, the statistics represent only a portion of the waterborne outbreaks that actually occur (Hopkins et al. 1985; Craun 1986; Blackburn et al. 2004 ). Blackburn et al. Outbreaks most likely to be recognized and investigated are those of (1) acute illness characterized by a short incubation period, (2) serious illness or symptoms requiring medical treatment, and (3) recently recognized etiologies for which laboratory methods have become more sensitive or widely available (Blackburn et al. 2004) . Increased reporting often occurs as water system deficiencies and WBDO etiologies become better recognized, often through improved state surveillance activities and laboratory capabilities (Hopkins et al. 1985; Frost et al. 1995 Frost et al. , 1996 .
Recommendations for improving WBDO statistics include:
(1) enhanced surveillance activities to better detect out-breaks;
(2) additional laboratory support for clinical and water analyses during outbreak investigations; and (3) increased attention to potential sources of bias during investigations (Craun et al. 2001; Frost et al. 2003; Hunter et al. 2003) .
Illness reporting
The suggests that infection may have been more widespread.
During the investigation it is important to recognize and take steps to control potential biases and assess their affects, especially recall bias. Recall bias may result in the reporting of more illnesses than actually occurred (Craun & Frost 2002; Craun et al. 2001; Cooper 1995; Hunter & Syed 2001) . 1930 1931 to 1940 1941 to 1950 1951 to 1960 1961 to 1970 1971 to 1980 1981 to 1990 1991 to 2002 Time period Average annual number of waterborne outbreaks 1930 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991 Figure 6 ). During the 20-year period 1971-1990, these deficiencies were implicated in less than 20% of WBDOs. Distribution system-associated WBDOs tend to be small, as contamination usually affects only a portion of the distribution system, limiting the potential exposure. On average during the past 32 years, these WBDOs resulted in 152 cases per outbreak. However, five distribution systemassociated WBDOs resulted in more than 1000 illnesses, with the largest causing 5000 illnesses. Although a chemical etiology is often found (35% of the WBDOs), distributionsystem WBDOs are also caused by bacterial (17%), protozoan (14%), viral (4%), or undetermined (30%) pathogens. In spite of better laboratory methods and more thorough investigations, WBDOs classified as acute gastroenteritis (AGI) of undetermined etiology continue to be important.
WATERBORNE OUTBREAK STATISTICS
ETIOLOGY OF WATERBORNE OUTBREAKS
Usually the etiology was not determined because specimens were not collected or laboratory analyses were not available.
However, in some WBDOs, the agent could not be identified even though laboratory analyses were available. During the five time periods that we analyzed, the etiology was determined in 37-73% of reported WBDOs (Figure 7) .
During the most recent 12 years, the etiology was determined 1930 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991 to 2002 Time period Average number deaths per year in time period distribution system, and mostly likely spread by aerosolization of water from the system, usually from hot water taps.
In two WBDOs, Legionella may have entered during a mains break or back-siphonage. (Table 3) .
Among the recently recognized waterborne pathogens is
Cyclospora, which caused a single WBDO in a Chicago building that housed hospital personnel . Other yet to be identified pathogens may become important. For example, two WBDOs of chronic diarrhea were reported, but no causative agent was identified even after extensive laboratory analyses (Parsonnet et al. 1989) . WBDO investigators are also encouraged to collect additional information about disease severity (e.g. physician visits, age distribution of cases).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
